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World Philosophies in Dialogue:
a Shared Wisdom?
»Indeed, philosophy is not defined directly by wisdom
[…] but by its strange, complex and unquestioned re-
lation to wisdom […] Philosophy does not know wis-
dom, does not produce it, but reaches for it, anticipates
it like a gift one would offer« (Marion 2003: 183).
»All humans are philosophers« (Gramsci 1975: 1342–
1343).
Abstract
Martin Heidegger’s lecture in 1964 ›The End of Philosophy and the
Task of Thinking‹ signalled a crisis and the acknowledgement of sub-
stantial changes withinWestern philosophy. Reflecting upon the con-
cept of critical dialogue among World Philosophies (WP) can be seen
as a corrective of this crisis and a novel advancement. I aim to sub-
stantiate this by referring to the work of three authors: i) Jean-Luc
Marion’s reflections on Heidegger will give us the chance to over-
come a narrow understanding of ›philosophy‹ and the possibility of
discovering »new horizons« for the discipline which are revealed as a
»donation« towards »wisdom«; ii) Reyes Mate’s considerations on
›Thinking in Spanish‹will offer, aided byWalter Benjamin, a concrete
example for renegotiating the space and the place for those »excluded
from thinking«; and iii) Paul Ricoeur’s meditation On Translation
puts forward the ethical element of »linguistic hospitality« and trans-
formation of the self when encountering alterity. While it is impossi-
ble to do justice to these authors in a short article, I maintain that
their work deserves close attention because it depicts the struggle
within Western philosophy on its way towards maturity: still en-
tangled with so many challenges derived from its troubled history,
this maturity appears only faintly, on the horizon, precisely, in the
form of ›traces‹. On these grounds, I believe that Anglo-European
11
philosophy can no longer postpone opening up to an indispensable
dialogue with other systems of thought wherein the presence of WP
and the renewed effort of many philosophers committed to this en-
deavour is recognised.
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I Introduction
In April 1964 Martin Heidegger’s lecture The End of Philosophy and
the Task of Thinking (Heidegger 1972) was delivered for the first time
at a colloquium on Søren Kierkegaard.1 Fifty years later, this essay
still prompts us to rethink the questions raised by Heidegger with
the intent of asking a further question which revolves around the
concept of ›World Philosophies‹ (WP): Could the »end of philosophy«
signal the beginning of ›philosophies‹, in the plural, and perhaps of
what could be defined as ›World Philosophies‹ ? If this is so, could we
also postulate that the »task of thinking« is not the reserve of ›wes-
tern philosophy‹2, but concerns other systems of thought, indeed all
other possible systems which, by extension and in their totality, could
be labelled ›World Philosophies‹ ?
In this article I will concentrate mainly on the task of demon-
strating, by way of several authors, how western philosophy might
open up and indeed become ready to consider the possibility of the
concept WP, not as an expansion and a continuation of western phi-
losophy, but as an encounter/dialogue with other systems of thought
which have in fact, at times, developed independently from philoso-
phy in the West. I limit myself to consider western philosophers pre-
cisely because I am appealing for a moment of self-reflexivity within
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1 M. Heidegger, »The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking«, in M. Heidegger,
On Time and Being, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1972, pp. 55–73.
2 I take ›western philosophy‹ here in very general terms and as coterminous with
›western thought‹, in order to locate it not as separate from, but part of a wider classi-
fication which would include all possible ›systems of thought‹, all of which belong to
the ›order of thinking‹ and hence equally committed to delving into »the task of
thinking«. At other times, I use the term ›Anglo-European philosophy‹ which has
lately gained more currency, as perhaps a more inclusive idiom.
this tradition. At the same time, I am concerned to avoid yet another
imposition coming from Anglo-European philosophy. While my
main task remains to prove this »possibility«, I am aware that an
effort to devise a proper methodology as to how this can be best
achieved remains lacking, but this deserves to be treated separately.
The present paper, however, serves the purpose of introducing a vari-
ety of problematic issues and concepts associated with the ongoing
effort of Anglo-European philosophy to disentangle itself from a
Eurocentric – or even egocentric – stance; as such, the essay only
foretells both a theoretical and a methodological urgency, but post-
pones a more thorough analysis to future undertakings. Similarly, I
purposely refrain here from taking a line of inquiry which might
insist on the ›wrongs‹ perpetrated by Western philosophy at the ex-
pense of other systems of thought since I would like to avoid trans-
forming this article into an expiatory confession of guilty conscious-
ness. Although this too must at some point be tackled, I prefer here to
concentrate on the positive elements shown by western philosophy in
welcoming the encounter with other systems of thought and hence
offering a possibility of critical dialogue.
II Reflecting on J.-L. Marion, R. Mate and P. Ricoeur
In order to properly engage with the questions raised by Heidegger’s
lecture, I propose a reflection on the works of Jean-Luc Marion on
donation and a »new horizon«, of Reyes Mate and his interpretation
of Walter Benjamin’s »monadological universality«, and of Paul Ri-
coeur’s »linguistic hospitality«. The three authors under examination
offer us a distinct approach: while they are in fact ›sympathetic‹ to-
wards Heidegger’s philosophy, they are at the same time critical of his
idea of the »closure« of philosophy so as to postulate, in different
ways, an effort of self-reflexivity and a movement towards »new hor-
izons« for western philosophy.
Jean-LucMarion: The Possibility of »Donation« As a »NewHorizon«
In his essay, »The ›End of Metaphysics‹ as a Possibility« (2003), Jean-
Luc Marion, refusing a polemical interpretation of Heidegger’s lec-
ture, stresses its positive aspect »as a possibility« and »as a revival of
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thinking« (Marion 2003: 166), precisely because »with the end of
philosophy, thinking is not also at its end, but in transition to another
beginning« (Heidegger 1973: 96).3 Weaving in and out of Heidegger’s
writings, Marion manages to point towards »what remains un-
thought in, about and by metaphysics« (ibid.: 171), thus opening up
towards this (new) »possibility«. He sets the pace by clarifying the
relevance of the task – »the end of metaphysics« – not as an »end
game« but as a »culmination« and a »completion of possibilities«,
thus recovering Heidegger’s understanding of technology as a funda-
mental part of this culmination (Heidegger 1972: 59).
Marion identifies the link between technology and the culmina-
tion of metaphysics in the concept of ›destruction‹ (Marion 2003: 171)
which, in Heidegger, goes hand in hand with the concept of ›nihilism‹
resulting from the »forgetting of Being« (ibid.: 173). However, while
»the nothing makes itself known with beings« (ibid.), this »forgetting
of being arises from a similar powerlessness to think nothingness as
such« (ibid.), thus falling back into ›the negation of being‹,4 to then
conclude: »Would overcoming metaphysics then mean overcoming
the mode of thinking that has predominated to the point of imperial-
ism – the imperialism of representation, armed with the power of
ordering and mathematical calculation« (ibid.: 173–174)? »No
doubt«, replies Marion. He is, however, committed to pursue the re-
consideration of the question of Being, despite its withdrawal, which
would also allow the possibility of positing »the task of thinking«
differently.
This paradox is expressed also in the almost tautological last sen-
tence of Heidegger’s text: »The task of thinking would then be the
surrender of previous thinking to the determination of the matter of
thinking« (Heidegger 1972: 73).5 Marion painstakingly retraces the
difference between Sein und Zeit (1927) and other articles written in
the 1960s, in which Heidegger operates a shift from »it is« to »there
is« [il y a], or es gibt (it gives): »In other words, in the final account, in
the final question, in the final ›destruction‹, the overcoming of meta-
physics depends on the determination of what the ›it gives – es gibt‹
14
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3 J.-L. Marion, »The ›End of Philosophy‹ as a Possibility«, in M. A. Wrathall (ed.),
Religion After Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 166–
189; M. Heidegger, The End of Philosophy, New York: Harper and Row Publishers,
1973.
4 Marion capitalizes ›Being‹ when quoting Heidegger and uses ›being‹ himself.
5 M. Heidegger, Time and Being (Heidegger 1972: 1–24).
involves« (Marion 2003: 177). However, it is not clear if the »it gives –
es gibt« is »tied to the question of being, or goes beyond it« (ibid.). In
short, while the French »il y a« and the English »there is« disregard
the ›givenness‹ of ›es gibt‹, Marion’s intent is to »validate the expres-
sion ›it gives‹ as a legitimate conceptual formulation« (ibid.: 178). In
so doing, he can ascertain that the ›end of metaphysics‹ »leads, in the
end, all the way to the horizon of donation«, since »the true imple-
ment for overcoming metaphysics is found in the donation […]«, as a
»new horizon« determined by »the task of thinking« (ibid.: 182).
Hence, for Marion, the overcoming of metaphysics, which does not
require abandoning the name of philosophy, still implies the question
of »what it overcomes«. Moreover, especially when (re)defining phi-
losophy, »we cannot follow any other path than that indicated by the
question ›What speaks in the It gives?‹« (ibid.: 184).
I would agree with Marion that »the ›task of thinking‹ will con-
sist first of all in determining this new horizon« and, despite the fact
that »philosophy is not determined directly by wisdom (or for that
matter, by knowledge, and even less so by science or representation)«,
it is indeed determined »by its strange, complex, and unquestioned
relation to wisdom«. This does not cease, however, to be a multifa-
ceted ›relation‹ : »A relation of affinity, of inclination, of familiarity,
of desire and of lack as well – a relation to what it lacks and loves to
possess« (ibid.: 183).
If I am not mistaken, the progression adopted by Marion, mov-
ing from technology (and imperialism) to nihilism, brings him to
postulate, via a novel interpretation of es gibt, that the ›donation‹
determined by the »task of thinking« delivers the arrival, as a »new
horizon« of the concept of »wisdom«, which seems now to determine
philosophy, be it by a »strange, complex, and unquestioned relation to
wisdom« (ibid.). Marion seems inclined to justify that the »self-trans-
cendence of metaphysics« does not entail the disappearance or aban-
doning of the name of philosophy as such, and the appearance of
›wisdom‹ – re-translating philosophy? – would seem to appeal for an
extension of »what [philosophy] lacks and loves to possess« (ibid.). In
other words, it is only through the ›yearning of philosophy‹ that the
latter sets itself towards the unfulfilled desire of expanding its pre-
sent, limited horizon, towards a new horizon and novel »task of
thinking«, which can only be donated by the renewal and re-transla-
tion of ›philosophy (as) wisdom‹. In this sense, metaphysics as an
overcoming of the being of beings, must be understood »on the basis
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of donation«, and this donation could find its point of arrival and
fulfilment in »wisdom«. Hence, wisdom seems to represent the
»new horizon« towards which the »task of thinking« directs itself,
almost as a corrective and an overcoming of »the mode of thinking
that has predominated to the point of imperialism«. Apparently, there
seems to be no correlation between wisdom and philosophy, because
if there were, wisdom would fall under the hegemony of philosophy.
Despite this ambiguous relationship, Marion nevertheless seems to
allow for a positive interaction between the two, since »[p]hilosophy
does not know wisdom, does not produce it, but reaches for it, antici-
pates it like a gift one would offer« (ibid.). The question, which I will
address in the concluding part of this essay, still remains: Is the gift
(of wisdom?) offered (presumably) by philosophy dispensed to all, or
is it solely the reserve of a few? Or, is it perhaps philosophy itself,
which – being placed on this »new horizon« – receives the »gift of
wisdom« from a third party?
Reyes Mate: Universality, Benjamin, and the »Voice of the Slave«
Some of the above questions are also addressed in the article by Reyes
Mate (2001) ›Thinking in Spanish: Memory of Logos?‹ to which I
turn now.6
In a famous interview published posthumously inDer Spiegel on
31March 1976, Heidegger seems to imply that »one can think only in
German or Greek« (Mate 2001: 247). Mate, without entering into a
»nationalistic dispute«, reminds us that for Heidegger the expression
Western or European philosophy is a tautology and he agrees sub-
stantially with Heidegger (ibid.: 249). However, »[t]his way of under-
standing existence is both a blessing and a curse, a great mission and a
terrible fate«, particularly when we take into account the »forgetful-
ness of being« (Seinsvergessenheit) and the »abandonment of being«
(Seinsverlassenheit) (ibid.). This forgetfulness has, according to
Mate, triggered the technological control of our planet, »which is the
most perverse expression of universality« (ibid.: 250) since »[it] can
only be a ›bad‹ universality precisely because it is imposed« (ibid.).
The theme of ›bad European universality‹ figures prominently
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6 R. Mate, ›Thinking in Spanish: Memory of Logos?‹, Nepantla: Views from South,
Vol. 2, No. 2, 2001, pp. 247–264.
in Mate’s essay. For instance, when addressing the main question –
What does it mean to think/speak in Spanish? – Mate argues that »If
Hegel was right, and with him modernity, one could not be modern
and think in Spanish« (ibid.: 254). Modernity might even allow us to
now ›ridicule‹ Hegel’s arrogant assertions, but that arrogance is still
deeply seated within most prejudgements of philosophy »namely, the
reduction of thinking to philosophy, the identification of thinking
with what is European, or the affirmation that the universal spirit
[Weltgeist] is European« (ibid.: 253). If technology has become the
shortcut to impose a ›bad universality‹ on the rest of the world, then,
Mate suggests that one adopt the Heideggerian strategy. This evokes
the cabalistic doctrine of the Tsimitsoum: the vacuum that follows
God’s self-withdrawal after creating the world ex nihilo.
Rather than giving in to ›reactionary universality‹ or to ›decon-
struction of every universality‹, Mate proposes to followWalter Ben-
jamin’s »monadological universality« (1968)7:
To remake history and hence to construct a universality following those
nearly erased footprints is like brushing history against the grain. Monado-
logical universality (that universality which consists in valuing as absolute
each singularity) constitutes a colossal undertaking that goes against all the
established and dominant conventions (Mate 2001: 258).8
In order to better clarify the concept of monadological universality,
Mate refers to Plato’s dialogue the Meno (Plato 1961: 364 – Meno,
81d), concentrating on the question posed by Socrates to Meno re-
garding a slave (»an undocumented and illiterate person«) previously
summoned by Socrates: »He is a Greek and speaks our language?«
(Meno, 82 b), thus prompting the idea of »knowledge as recollection
(anamnesis)«.9
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7 W. Benjamin, Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, New York: Harcourt, Brace
and World, 1968.
8 With an expression taken from theology (restitutio in integrum sive omnium),
Benjamin (1978: 313) »points towards a universality that takes into account the right
to happiness, even for the dead. […] The ›now time‹ is a way of acknowledging the
actuality and validity of the damage that was caused in the past« (Mate 2001: 257).
W. Benjamin, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, AutobiographicalWritings, H. E. Jeph-
cott (trans.), New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978.
9 Aptly, at this point, Mate refers to Levinas’s reflection: »The ideal of Socratic truth
thus rests on the essential self-sufficiency of the same, its identification in ipseity, its
egoism. Philosophy is egology« (Levinas 1969: 44). Plato, The Collected Dialogues of
Plato. Including the Letters, E. Hamilton, and H. Cairns (eds.), Princeton, New Jersey:
Socrates, however, knows that the slave speaks another language,
which is not Greek (Mate 2001: 259). Hence, Mate reaches a partial
but vital conclusion regarding his main question, and notices that
Maimonides (Mosheh ben Maimon) or Judah Halevi are left out of
an inventory of Spanish philosophers, either because they wrote in
Arabic, the ›other language‹, »or because rationality belongs exclu-
sively to the modernity that was born after 1492« (ibid.). In either
case, this reveals an interiorised attitude »that to philosophize is a
thing for Greek or German« (ibid.).
When returning to the main question, Mate is well aware that
even Spanish, which was never awarded the status of ›philosophical‹
language, »has shared the theoretical and practical domination of
modernity […] a language that has represented an empire and that
has been imposed violently on other people, forcing upon them its
vision of the world […] There is a thought in Spanish that far from
being the memory of logos is the site of forgetfulness« (ibid.: 260).
How can Spanish then recover the »forgetfulness of logos? Only by
recovering the »language of the slave« which narrates »experiences of
suffering caused by the reign of that dominating logos«. These are
contained in stories, songs, in the memory of the victims’ descen-
dants, or in silence kept from generation to generation« (ibid.). Span-
ish too, like any other language, recalls through these memories. As a
result, it projects two opposite visions of history. In order to attain a
universality which is based on a common history, the memory, and
the language of the slave are indispensable: »In order to reconstruct
the whole, in order to advance towards universality, the language of
the slave is fundamental and irreplaceable« (ibid.: 261). Although
Mate does not elaborate further, he touches upon the overlooked rea-
lity of ›grey zones‹ when analysing the power-structure of language,
since also »among the speaker of the language of empire there are
experiences of suffering and among the speakers of the language of
the slave there are also dominators« (ibid.). Indeed, the violence of the
European logos was active for centuries in loco, prior to being ex-
ported elsewhere, and once in ›new‹ territories, found fertile ground
and valuable allies there.
In his conclusions, Mate warns us about judging his considera-
tions as nostalgic and/or romantic, especially in view of a certain kind
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Princeton University Press, 1961; E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, Pittsburgh, Penn-
sylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1969.
of ›globalisation‹ taking place also within philosophy, with English
becoming its lingua franca. In order to safeguard the diversity of ton-
gues, which is overwhelming in Europe too, Mate suggests that one
should not follow the path of ›linguistic uniformity‹. Rather, the
strategy of translation, as »the major theme of our time« and the
»antidote to homogenizing thought« (ibid.) would prove to be more
fruitful. Here again, one should engage with Benjamin’s intuition
regarding the theory of translation. While Mate is more prone to
accepting a close similarity between the latter and Heidegger’s philo-
sophical recoiling – »namely, that thinking is not exhausted in one
thought, even if it has the prestige of philosophy behind it« (ibid.:
263) – I am rather more inclined to support Marion’s »new horizon«
as a departure and »new voyage« towards wisdom. As Mate himself
comments on José Saramago’s remarks regarding the vocation of
Spain and Portugal towards the South: »This new voyage can awaken
in us new capacities different from those that we presently carry in
the name of Western reason« (ibid.: 262).
I will return to Mate’s thoughts in the final part of my paper.
Here it suffices to emphasise that Spanish is but one example of the
trajectory followed by one of the many languages which composes
the complex mosaic of WP.While its similarities to other such experi-
ences makes us think in universal terms, its individual characteristics
point instead towards a distinctiveness of a ›monadological‹ nature.
Both, the ›language of the slave‹ and the task of translation indicate
one way of re-discovering a novel approach to »the task of thinking«.
Paul Ricoeur: Language, Translation, Hospitality
Following on from Marion’s concepts on donation and wisdom and
Mate’s views on the ›language of the slave‹, universality and transla-
tion, I now propose to bring the two together through the mediation
of Paul Ricoeur’s On Translation (2006).10
In the third and final essay of his book entitled »A ›Passage‹ :
Translating the Untranslatable«, Ricoeur brings to our attention the
work of François Jullien (2001),11 who, describing the relationship
between ancient China and classical Greece, postulates that »Chinese
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10 P. Ricoeur, On Translation, London, and New York: Routledge, 2006.
11 F. Jullien, Du temps, Paris: Grasset et Fasquelle, 2001.
is the absolute other of Greek – that knowledge of the inside of Chi-
nese amounts to a deconstruction of what is outside, of what is exter-
ior, i. e. thinking and speaking Greek« (Ricoeur 2006: 36). While Jul-
lien »maintains that Chinese verbs do not have tenses because
Chinese does not have the concept of time« (ibid.), Ricoeur raises the
question: »how do we speak (in French) about what there is in Chi-
nese?« (ibid.: 36–37).
Without disputing Jullien’s main thesis,12 Ricoeur turns it on its
head, proving, as a result – by finding support in Marcel Détienne
(2000)13 – that there is a ›construction of comparables‹, found by Ri-
coeur in the multiple and recurring translations of the Bible. All this
induces Ricoeur to say that »there is translation« – both, il y a and es
gibt? – and to recognise that, even beyond the translation of sacred
texts or masterpieces, »there always were the merchants, the travel-
lers, the ambassadors, the spies to satisfy the need to extend human
exchange beyond the linguistic community […]« (Ricoeur 2006: 32).
There is, as should be expected, a fundamental continuity be-
tween the way Ricoeur approaches philosophy in general and his
style of dealing with the specific problem of translation, making him
»a brilliant mediator between competing schools of thought«, but also
developing his own brand of »dialogical or diacritical hermeneutics«
(Kearney 2006: viii–ix).14 This intensive dialogue – favouring »the
long route over the short cut« (ibid.: xi) – assisted him in looking
beyond Heideggerian Dasein in the search of meaning of human ex-
istence, arguing that »the meaning of Being is always mediated
through an endless process of interpretations« (ibid.).
While engaging with all major theorists, Ricoeur offers his ori-
ginal interpretation regarding the ›task‹ of the translator, by retracing
familiar images of the »uncomfortable position of the mediator/
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12 More recently, some of Jullien’s theses have indeed been challenged. Most notably
by Wang (2008), in an extensive review of Jullien’s The Impossible Nude (2007), and
by Franke (2014). S. Wang, Review of F. Jullien, ›The Impossible Nude: Chinese Art
and Western Aesthetics‹, China Review International, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2008, pp. 234–
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pp. 4–24.
13 M. Détienne, Comparer l’incomparable, Paris: Seuil, 2000.
14 R. Kearney, »Introduction: Ricoeur’s Philosophy of Translation«, in P. Ricoeur, On
Translation, London, and New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. vii-xx.
translator« and his/her »dream of the perfect translation« always in
between »faithfulness and betrayal« but still believing in the »dialo-
gicality of the act of translating«, and to »find happiness« in the work
of translation through »the work of memory and the work of mourn-
ing« (ibid.: xvii-xix). Ricoeur’s innovative effort is rooted in his criti-
cal dialogue with philosophical hermeneutics and the way he proble-
matized ›interpretation‹ and easy access to meaning as opposed to a
plurality of meanings, already present in the polysemy of words and
the secondary meaning of symbols: »For Ricoeur the matter is clear:
there is no self-understanding possible without the labour of media-
tion through signs, symbols, narratives and texts« given that »[e]very
subject […] is a tapestry of stories heard and told« (ibid.: xix).
In spite of its »fragile condition«, Ricoeur’s »linguistic hospital-
ity« signals a new journey within the task of translation which also
implies a deeper, ethical commitment:
Despite the conflictual character which renders the task of the translator
dramatic, he or she will find satisfaction in what I would like to call linguis-
tic hospitality. Its predicament is that of a correspondence without complete
adhesion. This is a fragile condition, which admits no verification other than
a new translation […] a sort of duplication of the work of the translator
which is possible in virtue of a minimum of bilingualism: to translate afresh
after the translator.15
Indeed, as Kearney comments, »Linguistic hospitality calls us to fore-
go the lure of omnipotence: the illusion of total translation which
would provide a perfect replica of the original. Instead it asks us to
respect the fact that the semantic and syntactic fields of two languages
are not the same, or exactly reducible the one to the other« (ibid.:
xvii). While Ricoeur is telling us that a »perfect language« does not
exist and that we must acknowledge our finitude, he allows us to
carry on with the task and the commitment to translate:
Just as in the narration it is always possible to tell the story in a different
way, likewise in translation it is always possible to translate otherwise,
without ever hoping to bridge the gap between equivalence and perfect ad-
hesion. Linguistic hospitality, therefore, is the act of inhabiting the word of
the Other paralleled by the act of receiving the word of the Other into one’s
own home, one’s own dwelling (ibid.).
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15 I am following the translation provided by Kearney (2006: xvi) here. In the original
text, it is found on pp. 19–20 (P. Ricoeur, Sur la traduction, Paris: Bayard, 2004).
The practice – not just the concept/idea – of linguistic hospitality in-
volves a full return journey »by an engaged self which only finds
itself after it has traversed the field of foreignness and returned to
itself again, this time altered and enlarged, ›othered‹. The moi gives
way to the soi, or more precisely to the soi-même comme un autre«
(ibid.: xix), thus highlighting this »inner translation« as a continua-
tion of the journey into the »outer translation«, together with the
discovery of one’s own identity and the ethical demands addressed to
the self, emphasized by Ricoeur in Oneself as Another (1992).16 This
is, in other words, the applicability of »a new translation« or the pos-
sibility »to translate otherwise […] to say the same thing in another
way« (Ricoeur 2006: 25).
III Traces of ›New Horizons‹ and the
›Gift of Wisdom‹ for WP
In different ways, the three authors discussed above provide us with
remarkable entry points in responding to the challenges presented by
the end of philosophy. Rather than giving in to some form of ›philo-
sophical atrophy‹, their efforts in self-reflexivity show that western
philosophy can indeed take a different direction and thus postulate a
repositioning towards »new horizons« motivated by the welcoming
presence of other systems of thought.
Hence, to return to our initial questions: How can present day
Anglo-European philosophy accomplish its ongoing commitment to
the task of thinking? Indeed, is Anglo-European philosophy open and
ready to interact with other systems of thought, so that a possibility is
given for us to consider WP as a viable concept and an operative tool?
Has the aggressivity of the Greek all-powerful logos nullified this pos-
sibility for ever, despite the recognition of a ›weak logos‹ running
through thewestern traditions?17 There are somemoments of our past
philosophical history which signal the presence – as appearance and
disappearance – of a weaker logos and, following Ricoeur’s lead, we
could discover within this history those »hidden traces« (Ricoeur
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2004: 9–21)18 which foretell the new horizons announced by Marion,
and the new voyage wished for by Mate. It will not be possible to ac-
complish this here at great length but only in a very sketchy way, with
a promise to return to these initial findings, and investigate them in
greater depth.
Looking into the past of Western philosophy, we should recollect
that all works but two of Aristotle would have been lost forever, had
these not been translated into Arabic. Aristotelian influence on Isla-
mic philosophy was already evident during the time of Al-Kindi of
Basra (c. 801–873 CE) and Abu Nasr Al-Farabi (c. 870–950), and be-
came even more prominent with Ibn-Sina (980–1037) and Ibn-Rushd
(1126–1198) from Cordova in Al-Andalus (Spain), while later on al-
Gazali (1058–1111) showed opposition to this rationalism, in favour
of Sufism, representing the ›mystical side‹ of Islam.
During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the works of Aris-
totle and his Arab commentators were translated into Latin and they
provided the philosophical backbone for the Christian theology of
Thomas Aquinas. By making extensive use of Aristotle’s philosophy,
Aquinas wished to prove the humanistic and rational basis of his
theology. Meanwhile the Greek logos, figuring so prominently and
achieving a higher status in St. John’s Gospel, became the Verbum.
This philosophy/theology dominated the scene for many centuries to
come, but not without challenge. While Aquinas and his Dominican
disciples gave prominence to the Verbum Mentis, the Franciscans,
mainly a mendicant order, placed emphasis on the Augustinian Ver-
bum Cordis (Capuzzo 2011),19 in a fashion similar to al-Gazali’s op-
position to Aristotelianism.
Closer to our time, at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of
the twentieth century, despite much euphoria resulting from the En-
lightenment and modernity, Europe was plummeted into an unprece-
dented crisis which culminated in World War I where, for the first
time, technology was put to the service of death and destruction. Soon
after this war, many intellectuals intervened to express their opinion
on the crisis, such as the lecture delivered by Edmund Husserl in
23
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18 P. Ricoeur, Ricordare, dimenticare, perdonare. L’enigma del passato, Bologna: il
Mulino, 2004.
19 L. Capuzzo, ›Il verbum mentis nella polemica tra francescani e domenicani: Rug-
gero Marston critica Tommaso d’Aquino‹, Medioevo: rivista di storia della filosofia
medievale, Vol. 36, 2011, pp. 113–136.
Vienna on 10 May, 1935, bearing the emblematic title: Philosophy
and the Crisis of European Man.20 In antecedence, this very proble-
matique had been emphasised by Miguel de Unamuno with The Tra-
gic Sense of Life (1912).21
In a sense it could also be argued that Heidegger’s Being and
Time was a similar response to this crisis, when we take into account
in particular the emphasis on concepts such as ›concern‹, ›co-being‹
(Mit-Sein), and authenticity, to counterbalance the ontic, facticity and
anxiety of being-fallen. Post-Heideggerian philosophers have offered
a variety of responses and interpretations, including Heidegger’s stu-
dent, Hans-Georg Gadamer (2004 [1960]), who went to great lengths
to retrace the past history of hermeneutics so as to make progress
towards an ›effective historical consciousness‹ and a more meaningful
dialogue.22 His work has certainly had a great impact on philosophy as
well as other fields and disciplines. And yet, the suspicion remains in
many quarters that a sincere, critical, and all-inclusive philosophical
dialogue is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.
My point, however, is that our Anglo-European philosophy has
reached the end of the line of its narcissistic journey precisely because
it has remained entangled in the struggle for the pursuit of power and
the acquisition of a knowledge which would guarantee even more
power, rather than generating an effort to continuously rediscover
the task of thinking and with it the gift of wisdom. It might be worth,
for argument’s sake, to recall that the Greek word Sophia, from which
Marion presumably derives ›wisdom‹, is a feminine noun and, one
would assume, less devoted to the more ›masculine activity‹ of gain-
ing power especially through conquest, violence, and war.23
One trait common to the work of the authors discussed above is
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their critical-ethical stance when reflecting on the task of thinking
and its future development within Anglo-European philosophy, thus
obtaining a renewed task of critical-ethical thinking, which includes
an essential socio-political dimension of philosophical engagement.
This is rather evident in the ›monadological universality‹ proposed
by Benjamin and adopted by Mate, but also hinted at by Marion,
when he refers to »overcoming the mode of thinking that has predo-
minated to the point of imperialism« (Marion 2003: 173–174). Criti-
cal ethics is equally crucial to both Ricoeur and Kearney. The latter,
following his mentor, radicalises hospitality even further through
»the discovery of the wisdom of the stranger« and, although Kearney
is applying »an ethics of radical hospitality« here to discuss transla-
tion across faith cultures, the same »hermeneutic wager« can be ap-
plied to the encounter of WP: »an ethics of radical hospitality presup-
poses the challenging route of embracing complexity, diversity and
ambiguity rather than prematurely endorsing a spiritual Esperanto
of global norms« (Kearney 2014: 153).24 Indeed, the juxtaposition
here of religion and philosophy could provide us with a reason to
expand our (inadequate) notion of religious pluralism, supposedly
dictated by a sort of political correctness, with that of philosophical
pluralism, instead of insisting on playing our (mostly inadequate)
card: »They have religions, we have philosophy!«. The point is: there
cannot be a real, enduring commitment to the task of (critical-ethical)
thinking until all those who are capable of thinking are invited to
participate in this undertaking. This can be summarily expressed in
the Gramscian notion: »All humans are philosophers/thinkers«.25
Although an extensive philological discussion should accompany this
quote, my tentative ›re-translation‹ might be: »no human can ever be
considered a slave«, with the implication that the slave is defined as
the one who is prevented from thinking or, at least, whose thought is
25
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for our own pleasure seems to question whether we do indeed possess the ethical
stamina needed to welcome, or heed, the call for WP.
24 R. Kearney, ›Translating across Faith Cultures: Radical Hospitality‹, in P. Kemp,
and N. Hashimoto (eds.), ›Nature and Culture in Our Time‹, Eco-Ethica, Vol. 3,
2014, pp. 145–156.
25 Prison Notebook 10, »The Philosophy of B. Croce«. »Given the principle that all
humans are ›philosophers‹, i. e. that between professional philosophers or ›techni-
cians‹ and other humans there is no ›qualitative‹ but only ›quantitative‹ difference
[…] it must be, nevertheless, ascertained what this difference is« (Q 10, §52, 1342).
A. Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere, A cura di Valentino Gerratana, Torino: Einaudi,
1975 [4 Vols].
not even taken into consideration. To validate this hypothesis, which
underpins the concept of WP, we must appeal again to Benjamin’s
»monadological universality« according to which we »value as abso-
lute each singularity«. We must also return to Ricoeur’s »linguistic
hospitality« in order to welcome the »word of the Other« into our
own thinking, and must invoke Kearney’s »radical hospitality« so as
to re-discover »the wisdom of the stranger«.
To be fair to Marion’s concept of ›donation‹, we should take into
account his previous, vast output on ›givenness‹ and ›the given‹ (Ma-
rion 1998, 2002) and his most recent work on this topic (2011), which
is a task beyond the scope of the present essay.26 I must, however, at
least point out that Marion brings together Heidegger’s and Levinas’
work.27 Despite strong differences between the two,28 a deep presence
of ethics cannot be totally dispelled, even when Marion wrestles to do
so. Moreover, when retracing ›givenness‹ (Gegebenheit) all the way
back to phenomenology and in particular to Heidegger (Marion 2011:
19–49), Marion has to acknowledge »Heidegger’s entire trajectory«,
starting with the post-war lectures in January-April 1919,29 which
address »the gap between academic theoretical philosophy and life
itself« (ibid.: 35), and the text Zeit und Sein of 1962:
For, in the quasi-conclusive text of 1962, when Heidegger takes for the last
time the meditation upon »it gives, es gibt«, deploying there, it is true, a
phenomenological mastery far outstripping the approximations of 1919, the
task is still to think ›it gives‹ not only independently of thingliness and
theoretical objectivity but especially, this time, beyond being and time.
(ibid.: 49)
If, on the one hand, we might be puzzled by ›Heideggerian jargon‹
and perhaps by Marion remaining ›caught‹ within it, on the other, we
can also appreciate the mighty struggle taking place here, at the very
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gabe, Vol. 56/57, Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987; Towards the Definition of
Philosophy, T. Sadler (trans.), London: Continuum, 2008.
heart of Anglo-European philosophy (see Lewis 2011).30 These devel-
opments began with the period of time stretching from World War I,
the inter-war period – continued through the bewildering develop-
ments of Heideggerian philosophy – to reach his later meditation
and down to us, at present. This struggle happening within Western
philosophy is reflected also in the ambiguity and the difficulty – not
solely in Heidegger but the whole of Anglo-European philosophy – to
disentangle itself from a domineering logos which prevents us from
listening to other, different voices/words, uttered within different
languages, »beyond being and time«, often labelled as lesser lan-
guages, or the languages of the slaves, perhaps even unwritten and
anti-institutional languages. Within this struggle, rather than hold-
ing on to the power of a theoretical apparatus,31 Heidegger himself
reverts to an ›event‹ (Ereignis), in which even the certainty of dona-
tion as such is lost, so as to give place to a giving which becomes a
›sending‹ (Schicken).32 But if there is sending – similarly to donation
and gift-giving –, there must be a sender and also a receiver and the
two together seem to constitute a plurality within which the ›sending
is given‹, the event can happen, it can take place. Furthermore, it
necessarily constitutes a ›we‹ which did not previously exist. Even if
one agrees with Marion that the end of metaphysics »leads all the
way to the horizon of donation«, the question mentioned above still
remains: Is this givenness granted to all, or is it the privilege of a
select group? If so, does this group encompass all those who consti-
tute Anglo-European philosophy, or is to be restricted to further sub-
groups within this tradition? Respecting these laws of gift-giving, the
sending and receiving happens within a constituted community
where individuals and groups recognise each other and self-under-
standing is accompanied by mutual understanding and mutual recog-
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way, Being – that which It gives – is what is sent« (Heidegger 1972: 8).
nition. Here again, WP must reckon with this mutuality being ex-
tended to the whole of humanity.
For WP to succeed, we must be ready and able to listen to the
language of the other, so as to recognise that the stranger can think
and hence be able to produce systems of thought and reasoning. This
could be, in fact, the new horizon and the gift of wisdom, so that in
order to achieve true Mit-Sein (co-being) as a global endeavour for
humanity, we must also implement Mit-Denken (co-thinking) on a
universal scale. Heidegger reverted to Husserl in order to prove that
›the end of (European) philosophy‹ could represent an ›opening up‹ of
philosophy towards aletheia as ›dis-closure‹ : thus, Husserl’s state-
ment, »The stimulus for investigation must start not with philoso-
phies, but with issues and problems,«33 provided Heidegger with a
possible solution: »The phenomenon itself, in the present case the
opening, sets us the task of learning from it while questioning it, that
is, of letting it say something to us« (Heidegger 1972: 66). The pro-
blem envisaged by Husserl and highlighted by Heidegger seems to be
a loss of direction within (Western) philosophical investigation: the
failure of philosophy to be truly itself and hence announcing its end,
but not without proposing phenomenologically a new opening, one
very last task. The issue at stake here is »the task of thinking« and the
phenomenon is the opening which must take place at »the end of
philosophy«, towards a more comprehensive and inclusive approach
to thinking which would recognise – while questioning it – that
thinking or the gift of wisdom, can no longer be conceived as an ex-
clusive right of Anglo-European philosophy.
Relevant moments which have marked the beginning and devel-
opment of what has come to be known as ›Comparative Philosophy‹
and/or ›Intercultural Philosophy‹ would be most pertinent at this
point. This task, luckily, has been brilliantly covered by the article
written by the editorial team for the first issue of this very journal
as ›Confluence: A Thematic Introduction‹ (Kirloskar-Steinbach, Ra-
mana and Maffie 2014).34 Indeed, as we read there: »Comparative
philosophy is a vibrant field today, with a steady stream of new books,
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anthologies, journals, and blogs« (ibid.: 8). However, in the remainder
of the article, the authors take a realistic approach and illustrate the
present day scenario in which much resistance towards Comparative
Philosophy is still held in many quarters of institutional Anglo-Eur-
opean philosophy. There are, however, also many hopeful signs and
the launch of Confluence is in itself a proof that new horizons are
opening up for Anglo-European philosophy and that philosophers,
not only, of the Old Continent are ready for new voyages.
Taking into account our discussion thus far, and before drawing
to a conclusion, I would like to clarify some concepts which will help
us to identify possible theoretical and methodological lines of enquiry
concerning the future of WP. While in principle I am not against the
label ›Comparative Philosophy‹ (and to some extent ›Inter-cultural
Philosophy‹), it would be relevant to question its validity, or at least
to ›decontaminate‹ its deeper meaning, in order to achieve a better
result, mainly on two accounts:
a) the original meaning of ›comparative‹ (Latin com-parare) con-
tains ›parare‹, the idea of preparing for something, in the sense of
›getting ready‹, but also the idea of ›defending‹ and ›shielding‹, which
obviously implies a sense of confrontation in act, and a struggle of
one against the other;
b) the use of ›comparative‹ also in other disciplines, particularly
within the Humanities, has been rather controversial, as for instance
in ›Comparative Literature‹ and ›Comparative Religions‹, due to the
fact that an established hierarchy was already built within the com-
parison there, reflecting a knowledge-power component.
Should ›Comparative Philosophy‹ remain in use, we must make
every effort to dissociate ourselves from the confrontational character
linked with it, which reflects the spirit of the laws of the market. I am
not talking here, obviously, about healthy competition and construc-
tive debates, but about a style of organizational approach, apparently
based on efficiency, which is putting our departments under consider-
able stress and preventing us from focusing on our main duty: the
task of thinking. We have also better qualified this task as »critical-
ethical thinking«, while striving to conceive it as a common effort, as
co-thinking (Mit-Denken), derived from our pursuit of co-being
(Mit-Sein). This brings us to an alternative paradigm to ›marketplace
exchange‹ suggested here: donation and gift-giving.
Donation, even when applied to »the givenness of being that
gives itself«, must respect the laws of gift-giving, as seen above. Not-
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withstanding the complexity of this discourse and the negativity
which can be ascribed to ›the gift‹, I am inclined to support Marion’s
claim, but with some explanations. Firstly, the being that gives, does
not give itself exclusively to professional philosophers, or indeed to
some of them, even if these, through their expertise, might claim
more sophisticated access to it. As a consequence, Anglo-European
philosophy cannot boast sole access to the gift of wisdom coming
from this donation. Secondly, the gift received through donation, to
remain a proper gift, must circulate and cannot become the possession
of a select few. This would atrophise the gift itself. An even worse
scenario appears when the gift is transformed into an item of transac-
tion, thus falling into the sphere of a market-dominated economy (see
Hénaff 2002), which now seems a prevailing line of action in acade-
mia.35 Thirdly, the flow of gift-giving, once passed from being to
beings, cannot be conceived as unidirectional, since all have the right
to receive, as much as the right to give, so as to be recognised as part
of the one, human community. Given the imbalance that so far has
characterised our philosophical exchange, »the voice of the slave«
must find a privileged place in our dialogues. Fourthly, professional
philosophers, as much as other intellectuals and scientists, are mo-
rally obliged to treat with respect the ›data‹ – as datum, that is, a given
– which they have received, and of which they cannot claim posses-
sion. While they may occupy a position of power in terms of ›knowl-
edge‹, they are called to exercise their profession with utmost humi-
lity, so as to be able to communicate unadulterated knowledge. This
implies, contrary to current trends in education, that learning and
teaching cannot be governed solely by market laws, but by a desire
to share and an ability to learn, even by educators. Finally, if we were
to accept the perspective that the end of philosophy marks new hor-
izons characterised by the gift of wisdom, we would be already en
route – by recognising their presence – to dismantling the many pre-
judices accumulated within the history of Anglo-European philoso-
phy.
Gift-giving, particularly in line with the idea of ›sending‹
(Schicken) – being en route and reaching out – motivates the recipro-
cal recognition which occurs in dialogue. Despite the controversy sur-
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rounding this concept, which still contains the idea of ›logos‹, WP
would be assisted enormously by the support of critical-ethical dialo-
gue in which the presence of the ›dia‹ announces the event of a weak-
er logos, ›pulled apart‹ in different directions, but respecting the good-
will of both sender and receiver. Following the logic of the gift, no
individual group can appropriate the word to make it its own, since
this must continue to circulate, so as to involve as many as possible, in
particular those who have been silenced for too long a time.
The desire for connectivity also activates the indispensable con-
nection between philosophy, thinking, and wisdom. Although this is
deserving of a full article in itself, let it suffice, for the purpose of the
present essay, to confirm that thinking, understood as a task carried
out by the philosopher, finds itself between philosophy and wisdom.
It originates from the first, but moves towards the second. This seems
to be already present in Heidegger’s »task of thinking« understood as
»the surrender of previous thinking to the determination of the mat-
ter of thinking« (Heidegger 1972: 73). The idea of ›surrender‹ implies
a willingness to accept that »previous thinking« – identified by Hei-
degger as philosophy, which for him is only Western philosophy – is
superseded by the eagerness to reach for the core, or the matter of
thinking, thus exposing the deficiency of previous thinking. While
Heidegger, despite the movement of donation proposed by Marion,
seems to remain trapped within a restricted – albeit new – way of
thinking and doing philosophy, Ricoeur, as paraphrased by Kearney,
offers a challenging alternative with his view of a departure and re-
turn journey »by an engaged self which only finds itself after it has
traversed the field of foreignness and returned to itself again«. This is
also confirmed by the ›radical hospitality‹ proposed by Kearney.
Could then the »surrender of previous thinking« mean exactly that:
a full return journey and a readiness to listen to the language of the
other, without giving in to monolingualism but »embracing transla-
tion as a vehicle for creating a network of interlinguistic migra-
tions«?36 Within the perspective of this new horizon, wisdom would
not feature any longer as »the exotic outsider«, but as a common goal
for the »task of thinking« for every philosophy as an integral part of
every philosophical endeavour, as inspired by Benjamin’s monadolo-
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gical universality. Indeed, even for Heidegger »the attitude of think-
ing which is able to listen is paramount« (Tercic 2006: 110).37
Let me sum up: despite a long history of self-absorbed thinking,
Anglo-European philosophy shows signs of receptivity towards other
philosophies, thus allowing us to reconsider the »task of (critical-ethi-
cal) thinking« as a collective endeavour. If a new horizon discloses
itself for Anglo-European philosophy, this must include openness to-
wards other philosophies, in line with »monadological universality«
and »linguistic (radical) hospitality«, so as to acknowledge the pre-
sence of WP and to share with these the gift of wisdom, through a
sustained critical-ethical dialogue. Still further, a true radical hospi-
tality is happening – as an event (Ereignis) – when Anglo-European
philosophy remains attentive and welcoming to ›the sending of the
gift of wisdom‹ which comes to it from other close or distant philoso-
phies. In practical terms, there is a need, in line with Husserl, to ad-
dress »issues and problems« – the many questions raised in this essay
at both theoretical and methodological levels – so as to further stimu-
late our investigation. For, WP is not a given, but a gift always in the
sending.
–Cosimo Zene, SOAS, University of London, UK
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Approaching Shan Shui Art through Gadamer
Abstract
Shan shui art is a traditional style of Chinese landscape painting that
has had a lasting impact on Chinese culture. This paper attempts to
view a masterpiece of this genre of art – the artwork entitled ›Hermit
Dwelling in the Qingbian Mountains‹ by Wang Meng – from the
perspective of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophy of art in order to
show how such an artwork can convey an ontological insight for those
who experience it. Instead of viewing the artwork as simply an
aesthetically pleasing landscape and thereby relegating the experience
to the realm of feeling as is common in modern Western approaches
to art, I argue that the artwork is best understood as imparting mean-
ing into our lives by opening up a new perspective on reality. Specifi-
cally, I show the Daoist principles and concepts that underlie shan
shui art at work in Wang Meng’s (c. 1308–1385) masterpiece. The
Gadamerian approach adopted provides an appropriate avenue to re-
spect Wang Meng’s artwork and other paintings in the shan shui
genre on their own terms for those embracing a contemporary Wes-
tern aesthetic sensibility.
Keywords
Philosophy of art, Chinese landscape painting, Comparative Philoso-
phy, Wang Meng, the Four Yüan Masters, Truth and Method.
The Chinese painting style of shan shui (山水) gained prominence in
the fifth century and has had a lasting impact on Chinese culture ever
since (Zhen 2013: 8).1 In his commentary on shan shui art from the
eighth to the fourteenth centuries, Wen Fong argues that such paint-
ing was »infused with life not so much by the representation of rea-
lity as by evocation and reflection and the elicitation of associations
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